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The Ògovernment of anybody and everybodyÓ is bound to 
attract the hatred of all those who are entitled to govern men 
by their birth, wealth, or science.  
          
        Jacques Rancire, Hatred of Democracy 
 
Liberal democracy is in dire straits Ð the street revolts against markets and governments; 
voters propel anti-establishment parties into parliament; heads of state venture to save private 
banks with public money; and well-meaning public intellectuals of the Left and the Right 
demand, in the name of democracy, that more power be given to the people who are already 
at a loss how to handle the maddening complexity of the world they inhabit. In a word, 
democratic hopes have been thwarted by the current economic crisis - turned social, turned 
political, crisis. Notwithstanding increased street mobilisation, the impact citizens have on 
politics has reached its nadir. Public discontent, which was rising even during the prosperous 
1990s, has reached new heights since the onset of the financial meltdown of 2008 and the 
ensuing economic and social destitution. The formerly silent spectators are not just 
demanding more accountability and transparency, they request different politics: they are 
turning to contention and contestation, rather than validation of rule through the rituals of 
electoral democracy. From Athens to Madrid, from Lisbon to New York and Istanbul, los 
Indignados, the 99%, the Occupiers, and a Gerao  Rasca all send the same anxious 
message Ð a deep distrust in the capacity and willingness of elected officials to manage the 
crisis in ways that serve the common good.  
 And here we face a paradox: while the streets have seen the most intensive social 
mobilisation of the past decades, nothing meaningful follows in policy. Politics appears to 
have been confiscated by experts promising redemption through suffering: the politics of 
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austerity. Endorsing the ÒThere Is No AlternativeÓ (TINA) dictum that spurred the neoliberal 
turn in the 1980s, decision-makers have suspended decision-making. As some commentators 
have aptly remarked, we live in a time of post-politics. Public policy discussions are not even 
minimally plural: the Òcommon senseÓ of austerity has displaced any substantive debate on 
resolving the crisis, as the societal crisis itself is being presented as just a crisis of public 
finance. The imperative of national competitiveness in the global economy has made the cuts 
in social provision appear unavoidable Ð a trend that in fact predates the crisis. As incumbent 
political elites are doing away with politics and the social safety net is wearing out, social risk 
is being thrust onto the weakest citizens. Under such adverse circumstances, democratic 
hopes vanish, giving way to desperation and right-wing fantasies. The aspirations to freedom 
that spread after WWII on both sides of the iron curtain Ð aspirations that made possible the 
democratic revolutions of 1989 Ð are now drowning in a swelling fear of freedom. The time 
for judgment and responsibility, for weighing options, for imagination and change, i.e. the 
time for politics, seems to have passed. 
 
This volume argues for the need to overcome the naturalisation of the political discourse 
about the crisis and its iron-clad, unique solutions, and reclaim a notion of politics that 
involves several key elements: first, a meaningful commitment to making visible and 
problematising the forces stalling the democratic game; second, inclusive collective 
deliberations about alternative courses of action; third, the relativisation of expert knowledge 
for politics and resisting the concomitant temptation to reduce citizens to the status of clients, 
patients or mere spectators to elite decision-making; fourth, the free play of the imagination 
as a force of political innovation and institutional experimentation. Taken together, these 
interlinked elements constitute the essential background conditions for exercising what we 
would like to call Òthe right to politicsÓ.  If the EnlightenmentÕs emancipatory promise for a 
3 
 
life of experimental self-realisation is to have any real purchase, it presupposes a fundamental 
right without which democracy, self-determination, and any meaningful political engagement 
are impossible Ð the right to politics.  Activating the right to politics is the only viable 
antidote to the toxic policy logic of Òthere is no alternativeÓ that is now annihilating human 
control over the future, thus rendering policy decisions about our collective existence empty 
of choice and with that Ð void of moral content, thereby disabling political responsibility. In 
what follows, we will discuss each of these interrelated elements in turn, with a view to 
substantiating the theoretical promise this book makes. 
  The first condition for the exercise of the right to politics is that of identifying the 
agents responsible for the current predicament Ð as well as the social dynamics and structures 
making it possible Ð in a way that avoids vacuous references to impersonal, unpredictable, 
incontrollable forces of the market whose impact nobody can appraise, foresee and withstand. 
The language of inevitability and catastrophe absolves the culprits of the responsibility to 
redress the harm and to try to prevent future crises. The only beneficiaries of the portrayal of 
the crisis as ÒinevitableÓ,  ÒunforeseeableÓ, or ÒanomalousÓ are those responsible for the 
crisis and those carrying the guilt of failing to protect citizens in case of a crisis. We argue 
that no  effective management of the crisis and its aftermath is possible without an honest 
reckoning and reflection about the non-inevitable policy steps and the institutional 
arrangements that led us here today. Several of the chapters in this book contribute important 
historical Ð legal and political Ð analyses that denaturalise the language of inevitability, thus 
supplying the basis for a meaningful debate about the current predicament. 
 Secondly, we take the essence of democratic politics to be the discerning and 
weighing of alternative courses of action, legislative proposals, practices, policies, candidates 
and institutional structures, in formal fora but also in alternative spaces for politics. 
Democracy presupposes choices and careful examination of competing options in view of 
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serving the common good. Yet the response to the crisis has been invariably austerity and 
structural adjustment for the sake of financial stabilisation. The dissenting voices have been 
marginalised and delegitimised through a variety of strategies: the ÒideologicalÓ proposals of 
heterodox economists have been counterpoised to the scientificity of neo-liberal models Ð 
forgetting it was these models that brought about the crisis to begin with Ð while social 
movements have been taunted for being nave, confused, incapable of delivering a plausible 
alternative solution. The ground was thus cleared for imposing the unique solution, a solution 
with massive negative effects on the already disempowered citizens. Several contributors to 
this collection build on work in the history of political thought and contemporary political 
theory to highlight the merits of rethinking the parameters of citizen agency and to assess 
alternative spaces and practices of claim-making beyond strong publics. 
Which brings us to the third element of our take on politics: the desacralisation of 
science in order to undermine the epistemic privilege experts enjoy in contemporary 
democratic society. Appeals to science and expertise give technicians privileged place in 
decision-making. It is the supposedly neutral technicians Ð and not elected representatives Ð 
who decide on both the diagnosis and the therapy for the crisis, thus eroding further the 
already diminished political power of ordinary citizens. Given the increasing complexity of 
international markets, techniciansÕ voices are being granted predominant weight in decision-
making. Such views of the role of experts obscure the fact that, in the name of objectivity and 
reliability, science and expertise serve as conversation and contestation stoppers: no 
deliberation makes sense once the scientists have spoken. Correlated with the privilege 
experts enjoy is the relegation of citizens to the status of clients or patients of unaccountable 
elites and their specialists in crisis management. The angry voices of those who bear the brunt 
of the austerity policies do not resonate in the halls of power. CitizensÕ political efficiency Ð 
the capacity to have political claims translated in meaningful policies by political leaders Ð 
5 
 
has reached troubling lows. While we think there is effectively room for experts in 
democratic politics, we propose that their voice should be relativised, that their epistemic 
privileges be challenged, and that their claims of impartiality be always seen as suspicious by 
citizens who refuse to resign themselves to the role of spectators of elite decision-makers. 
Several chapters in this volume discuss the values that should guide expertsÕ intervention in 
democratic deliberations and exemplify what such interventions might look like. In addition, 
imaginative ways of reclaiming politics by ordinary citizens make the object of a generalised 
reflection in this volume. 
Last but not least, we argue that ours is a time when the courage of the imagination 
must be cultivated so that we can arrive at alternative visions of our common life for the 
future. The social destabilisation that crises trigger tends to unleash conservative instincts for 
clinging to the familiar in search of safety. It is by force of this logic that, in the middle of 
economic crisis, voters propelled to power the same center-right economically liberal elites 
whose neoliberal policies of extreme deregulation set off the economic crisis. If elections are 
any indicator of prevailing preferences, the popular vote at the nadir of the crisis in the 
mature democracies of Europe suggests that neoliberal capitalism has considerable popular 
support.1  Yet crisis is the best time for institutional experimentation. When familiar 
blueprints prove useless and old solutions donÕt work, when suffering is enhanced by the very 
recipes applied to alleviate it Ð by prescriptions given without citizen input, it is time that we 
look for available sources we have for projecting a different image of our community. It 
might be the case that the image will only be a negative one Ð one that merely tells us what 
we do not want our community to look like in the wake of this crisis. Yet this will still be a 
great advance over stubborn rehearsing of the same old truths reified in our common sense. 
Some of the chapters in this book deal precisely with the challenges imagination faces in the 
era of post-politics. The possibility of a positive notion of critique and political mobilisation 
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that avoids the pitfalls of the beaten track makes the object of careful reflection in several 
contributions to this collection. 
Given the contours of the account of democratic politics sketched here, it is important 
to emphasise that this book positions itself in opposition to recent contributions to democratic 
theory. Upon analysing the ever-diminishing space for meaningful democratic deliberations, 
some have proposed that we should tame our democratic expectations and calibrate our 
theorising in line with these new political realities. In an age when politics is experienced 
through the mass media as appearance and manipulation, in times of personalised politics and 
increased discretionary power of the executive, leaders produce public opinion rather than 
respond to it. We are told that in such circumstances, the time for an ÒocularÓ understanding 
of representative democracy has arrived. Representative of this take on contemporary 
democracy is Jeffrey GreenÕs widely discussed The Eyes of the People: Democracy in the 
Age of Spectatorship, where the author invites the audience to reconcile itself with the idea 
that vocal models of democracy are out of touch with the ways in which citizens experience 
politics nowadays. A more relevant and useful matrix for thinking about democracy today 
would be, the argument goes, to focus on the eyes of the people as the locus of political 
empowerment. Most of our political experience is reduced to listening and watching 
professional politicians speaking on our behalf, so much so that the majority of citizens are 
not decision-makers, but spectators who relate to politics with their eyes. Given this reality, 
democratic theory is invited to reinvent itself Òin a manner that respects the everyday 
structure of political experienceÓ (Green 2010, 4Ð6). Sceptical of the impact the voice of the 
people can have today, Green proposes that the gaze of the people, which inspects and tries to 
capture leaders off guard, in moments of candour, can ensure surveillance over the 
leadership. A plebiscitary Ð rather than a deliberative or participatory Ð model of democracy 
is thus deemed appropriate for the age we live in: Òthe plebiscitary model I shall defend 
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strives for ideals especially suitable to the fallen conditions that shape the way democracy has 
come to be experienced todayÓ (Green 2010, 7). Nowadays, he urges, politics is not about 
participative goal setting and deliberative decision making, it is mostly about empowering Ð 
an admittedly imperfectly legitimate Ð political class to govern. Popular empowerment lies 
with watching the leaders in a matter that examines, supervises, inspects and scrutinises. XX 
Such a scenario of the democratic game does allow the public to increase the pressures on 
elites for reason-giving and justification,   And while Green admits the elite of participating 
citizens Ð the most likely audience for his book Ð will find his proposal problematic, he 
concludes that, for the mass of citizens, plebiscitary democracy is a more appropriate ideal. 
 GreenÕs diagnosis of the contemporary predicament might be correct; yet his fallacy (and 
the quiet folly of traditional social theory more generally
2
) is that he takes Òthe everyday 
structure of political experienceÓ as a given. He discusses Òthe fallen conditions that shape 
the way democracy has come to be experienced todayÓ as unalterable and asks us to adjust to 
these conditions. In the silent and sanitised world of ocular democracy, where the ÒmassesÓ 
have no other political vocation but to bestow their blessing on politicians and experts, or 
sanction them with silent disapproval, the right to politics is demoted to a right to be 
governed.
3
 GreenÕs attempt to build an ethical model on the poor conditions of democracy 
today amounts to an invitation to theoretical resignation; it trivialises critique and should 
therefore look suspicious to those who believe in the necessity of reclaiming politics from 
technocrats, professionals and ÒsavioursÓ of all stripes and colours, i.e. from the often 
impermeable and unaccountable class of political leaders.  It is oblivious of the wisdom of the 
first, and often most insightful, adepts of democracy Ð that democracy is more than granting 
rulers a popular mandate to rule. In highlighting the power of democratic legitimacy and the 
fallibility of democratic governance, James Madison has warned that giving democratic form 
to despotic rule is among the greatest of political calamities.
4
 Democratic, responsive, power 
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is neither always responsible, nor always competent, as Alexis de Tocqueville already 
observed at the dawn of modern democratic government, because Òthe men who are entrusted 
with the direction of public affairs É are frequently inferior, in both capacity and morality, 
Éare unskilful and sometimes contemptibleÓ, while exercising arbitrary power Òstill greater 
than in despotic statesÓ (Tocqueville, 1990 [1838]: 240-241, 209.   
 Contra Green and in tune with MadisonÕs and TocquevilleÕs warnings, this collection 
seeks to capture the background conditions that make democracy Ð not ocular or spectatorial, 
but participatory and contestatory democracy Ð possible again. We should not reconcile 
ourselves with the diagnosis of the shrinking of the realm of politics and adjust the format of 
democracy, and the nature of critique, to that reality. Focusing on the gaze is futile, nay, 
perilous, if citizens have no power to shape the reality they perceive. Access to a wealth of 
information does not increase control over the very production of information. The 
worrisome ascent of far right, populist parties across Europe highlights the dangers of placing 
our hopes in the peopleÕs supervisory capacities. Populist leaders candidly provide the kind of 
theatre that can entrance the vision of the demos and supply it with ready-made, simplistic 
and deceiving visions of who is culpable for its woes.  
 The chapters in this volume constitute an invitation to resist resignation and contest the 
expertsÕ confiscation of decision-making, to think outside the hegemonic common sense, 
offer alternative diagnoses, and experiment with alternative cures. Generally, but particularly 
in times of crisis, it is perilous to underestimate, like the adepts of Ôocular democracyÕ do, the 
importance of challenging leadersÕ managerial views of politics, and especially of proposing 
alternative courses of action.  In this sense, the book prizes Hannah ArendtÕs insight that 
contextual, reflective judgment is the political faculty par excellence. Through reflective 
judgment, novelty is possible in the political space. And, since everyone has the capacity to 
judge Òwithout banistersÓ, citizens must re-appropriate politics and not let themselves be 
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transformed into customers, patients, or gazing spectators. The contributions in this volume 
invite the reader to ponder the imperative to reclaim politics, inside and outside conventional 
arenas of public life.  
 While thinking creatively is an ever-present feature of democratic politics, it is 
particularly important in times of political and economic crisis. We take uncertainty, 
fallibility, contention and contestation, plurality and imagination to be the defining features of 
politics. In denying all these features, i.e. in suppressing the possibility of novelty through a 
naturalisation of the TINA doctrine, the current democratic leaders have forgone a political 
approach to the crisis. Without fetishising crisis, we argue that it provides us with an 
opportunity for innovation, for contesting the ossified and silencing Òcommon sense.Ó It is the 
time for alternative communities of judgment to assert themselves, muddy the clear waters of 
technocratic approaches to politics, expand the ethical universe to the economy, and provoke 
institutional actors to respond to new ways of thinking about ÒourÓ shared world. Against 
ocular views, the contributors to this volume see crisis as a time to act, not to adjust and 
resign ourselves to the confiscation of politics.  
 Given our understanding of the conditions for the exercise of the right to politics Ð as 
well as our concurrent scepticism towards ocular views of democracy Ð we have isolated 
three main concerns for our project: First, the loci of revival: where can democratic politics 
flourish in the wake of the crisis? What are the spaces where the right to politics could be 
meaningfully exercised? Second, the modes of revival: what are the practices that embody the 
right to politics? What strategies of generating constructive political conflict and reclaiming 
democracy should be adopted in order to effectively influence policy? In other words, what 
innovative practices can count as exercises of the right to politics and how can they be 
politically efficacious?  Third, the critique of revival: how should we reinvent democratic 
theory to grapple with these challenging times? How can we theoretically reinvent ourselves 
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in order to account for the challenges Ð but also the opportunities Ð facing those who want to 
exercise their right to politics? 
1. This collection is structured to address these three themes of the spaces, practices, and the 
critique of democracyÕs resurrection through a revival of the right to politics. The first part of 
the book seeks to identify new spaces for democratic politics to flourish, by raising a series of 
interconnected questions: Under what conditions can citizens discern viable social and 
political alternatives to the naturalised status quo? In what fora can citizens make claims 
efficiently? What are the geographies democracy needs to (re-) appropriate for its 
regeneration? Where can pressure be applied? Do we need to transform or rather substitute 
representative democracy? And can the new media empower protest? The authors in this 
section tackle these questions with a view to identifying productive spaces for democratic 
reclamation. 
 The first article in this part of the book responds to those who have lost faith in 
representative democracy. Against claims about its demise, Paulina Tambakaki works within 
an agonistic framework and tries to defend the salience of representative institutions by 
arguing that they can still be important venues and targets of claim-making. Her perspective 
avoids messianic tones and concedes that neo-liberal hegemony may not be vulnerable to 
punctual, precise claims that press for responsibility and responsiveness. Nonetheless, such 
processes of claim-making are likely to intensify the struggle against depoliticisation. It is by 
force of these contestatory dynamics of claim-making that representative institutions still 
have the potency to revitalise democracy  
 In contradistinction to Tambakaki, Keith Breen tries to expand our notion of traditional 
democratic spaces and contests the assumption, shared widely by ordinary citizens, elites, and 
theorists (including Hannah Arendt and Jrgen Habermas), that work processes and 
workplace organisation must rest in the hands of managers, not workers themselves. He 
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appeals to normative arguments for institutionalising meaningful forms of work and for 
workplace democratisation grounded on the ideal of freedom. To support these arguments, 
the chapter explores two important examples of successful workplace restructuring Ð VolvoÕs 
innovations in automotive assembly in Uddevalla, Sweden, and the recent emergence of 
Òworker-recuperated enterprisesÓ in Argentina. Thus, the chapter directs attention to 
successful instances of institutional experimentation that suggest already available resources 
for activating alternatives to the neoliberal status-quo.   
 Jodi DeanÕs contribution scrutinises another widely acclaimed space for democratic 
appropriation Ð the virtual sphere Ð and dispells our enchantment regarding the potentialities 
for democratic action thought to be latent in it. While the digital revolution has been 
celebrated as marking a new age for political mobilisation and participation, Dean argues 
that, as an expression of communicative capitalism, it is profoundly depoliticising. A 
distinction emerges between two independent forms of politics: politics as the circulation of 
content through the new media, and politics as the activity of officials. While democracy 
presupposes that communication in the public sphere influences political decision-making in 
formal institutions, a dramatic disconnect between these two forms of politics seems to mark 
the present. What is more, the multiplication of communications and their increased intensity 
prevents the formation of a strong counter-hegemonic position that would serve as a 
meaningful counter-force to the activity of officials. ÒExpanded and intensified 
communicativity neither enhances opportunities for linking together political struggles nor 
enlivens radical democratic practicesÑalthough it has exacerbated left fragmentation, 
amplified the voices of right-wing extremists, and delivered ever more eyeballs to corporate 
advertisersÓ (Dean,  XX) 
 With voices across the political spectrum now calling for divesting the state from its 
coercive power over citizens and repatriating power to Òthe peopleÓ, the state has become an 
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unlikely venue of democratic politics. That is why Claus OffeÕs contribution to the volume is 
rebelliously illuminating as it places the state (back) in the centre-stage of democratic 
politics. Offe argues that public authority is suffering from a political affliction known as 
ÔungovernabilityÕ, which is being played out, experienced, as a failure of democracy as a 
political regime. To vindicate democracy, we need, therefore, to rebuild the political 
infrastructure of public authority in such a way as to enable it to govern, again, in the public 
interest. Here Offe articulates a perpective of critique that focuses on the endogenous 
dynamics of crisis and renewal within the institutional arrangements that guide policy action 
by providing particular incentives to actors. He suggests that we "endogenise", in an 
institutionalist perspective, those factors that deprive democratic governments of their 
authority and capacity to act effectively. The perspective of theorising is thus framed to steer 
us away from both the rationalism of agent-cantered models and the functionalism of 
anonymous structures Ð trajectories of analysis that have enabled many analysts of our 
predicament to make the shortcuts of either imputing the societal crisis to inept politicians 
and greedy bankers, or to the unruly play of untameable market forces. This in turn invites us 
to seek solutions in the direction of institutional re-structuration of contemporary capitalist 
democracies. Within this broad perspective of what we might call Ôendogenous 
institutionalismÕ, the contributions in the second and third section of this collection develop 
specific modalities of critique.  
 
The second section of the collection addresses the theme of the practices of democratic 
renewal. What are the faculties and attitudes necessary for overcoming the current impasse? 
How can the represented begin to exist politically in a meaningful way, beyond the moment 
of delegation? Which new and increasingly influential modes of political discourse should be 
rejected, and why? And what new and untried modes of democratic politics should be 
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adopted, and why? The articles in this section perform two functions: a diagnostic one Ð 
various authors try to trace the historical processes that have brought about the current 
democratic deficits Ð and a therapeutical one, pointing to potential mechanisms of redress. 
While coming from two different disciplines (law and political theory), Tamara Lothian and 
Alessandro Ferrara share a historical perspective and reinforce each otherÕs conclusions and 
solutions. FerraraÕs analysis invites us to rethink our conception of democracy in its historical 
context and emphasises the challenges that recent economic changes pose for the possibility 
of accountable government by the people. Contemporary democracies have to face 
tremendously inhospitable conditions Ð within and beyond their borders. The marketÕs 
absolute power over democracy is the defining feature of contemporary politics: the market 
can influence the lives of all without being subject to the law. Laws Ð domestic and 
international Ð are made in view of providing an optimal setting for economic transactions. 
Harnessing the absolute power of the markets requires a realistically utopian vision of 
democratic re-embedment through the application of five principles Ð all deriving from the 
values of democratic accountability and transparency: Òa) the revitalisation of the principle of 
separation of saving and venture capital; b) the principle of tax-payersÕ Ôtemporary takeoverÕ 
of banking institutions in distress; c) the principle of democratic Ôtrickle-upÕ, as opposed to 
neoliberal Ôtrickle downÕ; d) the principle of individual accountability for the aggregate 
effects of oneÕs economic actions and the creation of state run insurance plans, mandatory for 
all individual investors; e) the principle of the full accountability of rating agencies for the 
effects of their judgmentsÓ (Ferrara, XX) While not constituting a fully-fledged blue print, 
these guidelines constitute important starting points for denaturalising the language of 
inevitability and for imagining institutional innovation.  
 Lothian agrees with Ferrara in arguing that finance has become Òthe star example of 
ÔcaptureÕ of government by powerful private interests!Ó (Lothian XX). Building on a rigorous 
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analysis of the historical processes that culminated in the crisis, Lothian offers a structural 
argument that positions itself against naturalising and depoliticising narratives about the 
origin of the crisis. Three crucial themes have been obscured in discussions over how to 
tackle the financial crisis: the link between redistribution and recovery, the connection of 
finance to the real economy, and the lack of democratic accountability. The diagnosis Ð as 
much as the treatment Ð requires us to look beyond the economy, rethink the very 
constitutional organisation of the state, and use law innovatively to protect democracy. Like 
Ferrara and Tambakaki above, Lothian believes in the capacity of representative institutions 
to experiment with various solutions within the framework of possibilities that democracy 
provides, with a view to building a toolbox of contextually attuned legal-institutional 
arrangements. 
 The next two papers shift the focus from the macro, institutional level to the level of 
citizen empowerment. Arjun Appadurai invites us to stop prizing politically efficient citizen 
action and to inquire whether there is something to be learnt from instances of political 
inefficiency. Even when failing to achieve their intended goal, claims to injustice the 
disadvantaged utter destabilise the contexts in which these claims are made. Thus, these very 
failures constitute a resource for achieving justice, rather than a cause of desperation. He 
directs our attention to the global South and examines the nature of deliberative contexts in 
poor democracies like India. In his paper, he investigates the role of apparent failures of 
efforts to increase the role of the poor in deliberative contexts, to suggest that what might 
seem failures in any given instance may transform the political environment in the long run. 
Building on insights from the philosophy of language and on work about failed performatives 
by Judith Butler and Shoshana Feldman, Appadurai argues that, while it is obviously the case 
that many statements by the poor have no positive effects within deliberative spaces, they 
may, when repeated, rehearsed and reiterated, contain the seeds of performative success. 
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Through a combination of philosophical and ethnographic work, he shows how failed claims 
by the poor can, in the long run, alter a disempowering and unfair context of deliberation. 
The challenge is to maintain sufficient political hope to continue the transformative work of 
failing. 
 Matthew FluckÕs contribution critically examines the value of whistleblowing and the 
promise of transparency in times of political disenfranchisement and economic dire straights. 
The paper dispels the vain hopes we might be tempted to place in such practices and invites 
us to critically reconsider this crucial value of transparency. The emancipatory and 
legitimacy-enhancing function of transparency has been historically celebrated by the 
champions of democracy. Bradley Manning, Edward Snowden and Julian Assange currently 
enjoy global notoriety. While these instances of whistle-blowing make it appear that 
transparency is having a comeback, Fluck warns us not to overestimate the democracy-
enhancing role that transparency Ð understood as access to information Ð plays nowadays. 
Instead of focusing on accessing pre-formatted data, citizensÕ efforts should focus on the 
quality of the data, on interpreting and assessing it critically. A conception of transparency as 
publicity Ð as collective citizen evaluation of the way in which data is produced Ð is more 
appropriate for the 21
st
 C and the problems facing democratic societies. 
It its third section, the book addresses more directly the issue of critique. The pluralisation of 
the places and practices of democratic engagement does not in itself guarantee that 
democracy would have any perforamtive purchase. What does this all mean for democratic 
theory? How can we rethink democracy when the streets are bustling with mobilisation yet 
nothing gets through to those who govern? How can we reinvent a modus of thinking 
democracy to prevent democracy becoming captive of the powerful legitimation resources of 
neoliberal capitalism that demand self-reliance and self-empowerment?  Are our tools of 
critique sharp enough for making sense of todayÕs reality or do we need to reconsider our 
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approaches? Do we need to reach out to other disciplines? And where can our hopes lie? The 
right to politics on which we assert that the effective resurgence of democracy depends, 
expands the spectrum of conceptualisation of democracy much beyond authoritative notions 
of self-rule. It demands that democracy takes a distance from itself, that it resists the 
seduction of becoming its own justificatory horizon.  
 Of all the authors in this volume Noelle McAffee is the one that most directly takes on 
the challenge of criticising the depoliticising, naturalising and conservative effect of 
neoliberal discourses about policy, in general and in particular in relation to the financial 
crisis. Building on the work of Hannah Arendt Ð and expanding her notion of the political to 
include social concerns Ð McAffee tries to contribute to current democratic theorising by 
proposing a notion of political deliberation that will hopefully help remedy legitimacy 
deficits. Her main argument is that, while acting according to different guiding principles, 
social movements and public deliberative bodies can complement each other in countering 
the depoliticising tendencies of political leaders disconnected from their constituencies. 
Incorporating insights from actual practices of contestation, the author offers an account of 
how political efficiency and accountability could be enhanced through a combination of 
public deliberation and social activism. 
 Nikolas KompridisÕs chapter intervenes in debates over the work democratic theory can 
do in times of crisis and tries to offer an alternative account of critique. On his view, critique 
should play a disclosing role, one that reveals to us the possibilities for innovation for our 
future collective life. Building on Arendt and Gadamer and engaging with Foucault and 
Derrida, Kompridis seeks to displace the understanding of critique as interrogation and 
deconstruction. Instead, he pleads that we need to return to utopian thinking: no democracy is 
possible without utopian longing. To give concreteness to his notion of positive critique, 
Kompridis discusses studentsÕ reactions to the disproportionate use of police force on campus 
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in the UC Davis case. Through their silent human chain the students proposed an alternative 
way of being together as a community, thus exemplifying that utopian longing so essential 
for a positive notion of critique. 
 Tracing the emergent trend in democratic theory of sourcing the collective will from 
plural and diverse publics in the private and social spheres, rather than the public-political 
sphere, David ChandlerÕs analysis focuses on what he names Ônon-linearÕ approaches to 
democracy. These approaches seek to overcome the rationalist assumptions of the 
public/private divide, thus discerning the democratic potential of everyday life. Within these 
approaches, democracy is no longer seen to operate as a collective will standing above 
society; democracy becomes endogenous to society, thereby becoming a mechanism to 
distribute power more evenly through the social empowerment of individuals and 
communities in their everyday practices. Disclosing surprising affinities between the modes 
of thinking of John Dewey and Friedrich Hayek, Chandler simultaneously provides an 
alternative to authoritative discourses on democracy and a suggestive illustration of the traps 
such alternatives carry in their turn.  For when we appeal to bringing government back to the 
people, and seek democracy in the personal decisions made in everyday life, donÕt we 
absolve public authority from its political responsibility? Does the devolution of power from 
the heights of political management to the depths of everyday life - devolution done in the 
name of democracy - deprive democracy of that infrastructure without which the right to 
politics loses its potency, as in the case of ungovernability Claus Offe addressed earlier in the 
volume? It was a deliberate choice of ours to refuse to take a side between the allegedly dated 
authoritative notions of democracy and the innovative approaches that sparkle with fresh 
ambition. Even as we urge democracy to re-invent itself mobilising the redemptive resources 
of the current crisis , we prefer to keep our awareness that, in the process, it risks to reinvent 




Taken together, the voices weÕve gathered in this volume invite readers to seek the resources 
needed to (re)claim democracy by invoking the fundamental modern Ôright to politicsÕ and 
securing the conditions for its actualisation. The overall ambition is to point out several 
possible mechanisms and venues for reclaiming politics and thus re-energise democracy, 
discerning possibilities to (re)constitute the places for democratic engagement, to (re)invent 
democratic practices and to (re)consider our understanding of social critique. Without falling 
prey to a romantic notion of the democratic public sphere, the book cultivates realistic hopes: 
realistic, for in seeking opportunities one must also take into account the difficulty of 
overturning the limits of the normalised possible; hopes, because a commitment to 
democracy is incompatible with resignation. In this sense we, as editors, see the chapters 
neither as definite diagnoses of our democratic predicament, nor as recipes to be followed, 
but as provocative invitations to a debate about the direction we take from here, politically 
and theoretically.  It might be our personal biographies as thinkers brought into intellectual 
existence by a discontent with the everyday political reality of autocratic socialism in our 
native Bulgaria and Romania that has made us intolerant to stale political regimes, whatever 
their substance. A democracy resigned to its deficits is to us unpalatable. We are not ready to 
say, along with the Spanish indignados: ÒWe are not against the system, the system is against 
usÓ. It is not enough to tinker with an otherwise objectionable system to make it more 
inclusive.  An inclusive, but lame democracy, comfortably reconciled with its flaws and 
adjusted to its professed limitations, void of the tempestuous energies of competing 
alternatives and conflicting interests, in a word -- a democracy that has given up its right to 
politics -- is hardly much better than its contemporary rivals, the uncertain autocracies of the 
post-communist world.  We trust that a combative, restless, inspired democracy, nourished by 
19 
 
a rebellious penchant for experimentation and improvisation is attainable and therefore Ð 
worth a good fight.  
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 Elections in 2010 and 2011 brought to power the centre-right in Spain, Portugal, 
Switzerland, Finland, Andorra, Ireland, Italy, Denmark, Britain, and the Netherlands Ð to 
consider only the ÔmatureÕ democracies of Europe. In that period the majority of the vote 
went to the centre-left only in Sweden, where the Social Democrats scored only 0,6 
percentage points higher than the economically liberal Moderate Rally Party. 
2
 Here we have in mind the difference between ÔcriticalÕ and ÔtraditionalÕ social theory, as 
conceptualised by Max Horkheimer Ð while the latter is committed to a correct description of 
social phenomena, the former scrutinises the structural and institutional circumstances of 
domination and oppression, seeking to identify a path of emancipation, Òto liberate human 
beings from the circumstances that enslave themÓ (Horkheimer 1982, 244).  
3
 On the difference between politics and governance see Azmanova 2012, Ch.1.  
4
 ÔOne hundred and seventy-three despots would surely be as oppressive as oneÕ (Madison, 
Hamilton, and Jay [1787-88], 311) 
